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“TIME WORKS CHANGES”: MODERNIZING 
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW TO PROTECT 
CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION 
Abstract: In 2012, federal juries convicted two men of armed robbery based in 
part on historical cell site location information (“CSLI”) evidence. Historical 
CSLI can reproduce a person’s location with great specificity. Cell phone users 
generate CSLI automatically by operating their cellular phones. These facts raise 
serious privacy concerns. This Note argues that Congress must take action to en-
sure that law enforcement agents can access a suspect’s historical CSLI only after 
a neutral magistrate finds probable cause that a crime has been committed. Fur-
ther, this Note argues that because cell phone users do not voluntarily convey 
CSLI to their phone companies, the government may not, absent a probable 
cause warrant, access that information by invoking the third party doctrine an-
nounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in its1979 decision in Smith v. Maryland. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 10, 2012, in United States v. Davis, a jury in federal district 
court in Florida found Quartavious Davis guilty on seventeen counts stemming 
from his commission of seven armed robberies in 2010.1 Less than three 
months later, in United States v. Graham, a jury in federal district court in 
Maryland found Aaron Graham guilty on seventeen counts arising from his 
perpetration of six armed robberies in 2011.2 The prosecution in both cases 
obtained and used the suspects’ historical cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) by meeting a statutory standard of justification that requires less ju-
dicial scrutiny than the traditional probable cause standard mandated by the 
Fourth Amendment.3 Historical CSLI is data that the cellular service provider 
creates and keeps about the communication between an individual cell phone 
                                                                                                                           
 1 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 
(2015); Jury Verdict at 1–5, United States v. Davis, No. 10-20896 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2012), ECF No. 
293. 
 2 United States v. Graham (Graham I), 796 F.3d 332, 338–39, 342 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g, 
824 F.3d 421, 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Graham II); Jury Verdict at 1–5, United States v. Gra-
ham et al., No. 11-00094 (D. Md. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 139. 
 3 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344; Davis, 785 F.3d at 502; Memorandum Opinion on Defendants’ 
Motion to Suppress Historical Cell Site Location Data at 3–4, United States v. Graham, No. 11-00094 
(D. Md. Mar. 1, 2012), ECF No. 84; Scott A. Fraser, Note, Making Sense of New Technologies and 
Old Law: A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
571, 574–75 (2012). 
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and the cellular network.4 In 2015, on rehearing, an en banc panel of the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s use of historical 
CSLI in the Graham case violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizure.5 
A lively debate exists as to whether citizens are aware that, through a 
court order under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), the government 
may obtain their historical CSLI without a showing of probable cause.6 In a 
growing number of jurisdictions, individuals lose an objective expectation of 
privacy in their physical location simply by switching on their cellular tele-
phones.7 Judges rationalize this view by reasoning that because subscribers 
receive notice in their contracts that service providers collect CSLI, just turn-
ing on a cell phone equates to a voluntary CSLI transmission.8 Some judges 
believe otherwise and have held that cellular service contracts do not provide 
sufficient notice to subscribers, meaning that most subscriber CSLI transmis-
sions are involuntary.9 
Regardless of how our society eventually settles the debate over whether 
law enforcement agencies must have probable cause to obtain historical CSLI, 
the fact remains that five federal Courts of Appeals covering more than 155 
million Americans have approved acquisition of historical CSLI by law en-
                                                                                                                           
4 See Fraser, supra note 3, at 574–75 (defining historical cell site location information (“CSLI”)). 
Unlike prospective CSLI that encompasses the user’s real-time data, historical CSLI refers to the user-
generated data that the cellular service provider preserves. Id. 
 5 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 343; Davis, 785 F.3d at 500. 
 6 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (declining to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the defendant’s historical CSLI); Graham I, 796 F.3d at 347 (determining 
that tracking a criminal suspect to his home through the use of his CSLI violates the suspect’s reason-
able expectation of privacy); Davis, 785 F.3d at 511 (holding that cell subscribers have no objective 
expectation of privacy in their CSLI). The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) directs magistrate 
judges to issue court orders for CSLI on a showing of specific and articulable facts demonstrating that it 
is reasonable to believe that the records requested are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 7 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 511 (deciding that individuals have no objective expectation of privacy 
in their historical CSLI); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2013) (declin-
ing to find an objective expectation of privacy in cell phone users’ historical CSLI); In re Order Di-
recting a Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t (Elec. Commc’n Serv.), 
620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). In In re Electronic Communication Service, the Third Circuit de-
termined that the magistrate judge below erred when she found the SCA required a probable cause 
standard due to the privacy interest implicated in CSLI. 620 F.3d at 313. 
 8 Davis, 785 F.3d at 511; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613, 614. In In re Historical 
Cell Site Data, the Fifth Circuit determined that users voluntarily turn over their CSLI to their service 
providers. 724 F.3d at 613. The court reached this conclusion after observing that user agreements 
inform subscribers that their providers collect this information, and also that cell subscribers under-
stand that their devices must send a signal to a nearby tower in order to connect their calls. Id. at 614. 
 9 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355–56 (holding that users do not voluntarily convey their CSLI to 
their carriers, and that consent to warrantless acquisition of CSLI is a myth); Davis, 785 F.3d at 534–
35 (Martin, J., dissenting) (opining that cell phone subscribers do not voluntarily convey CSLI when 
they receive a call). 
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forcement on a low, “specific and articulable facts” standard.10 The Depart-
ment of Justice has argued in favor of this approach before at least two federal 
Courts of Appeals.11 In response, civil liberties watchdogs and technology pro-
ponents assert that the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain 
a warrant based on a showing of probable cause for the collection of historical 
CSLI.12 
When the government obtains a criminal suspect’s historical CSLI from 
his or her cellular carrier without first demonstrating probable cause to a neu-
tral magistrate, that suspect experiences an invasion of his or her Fourth 
Amendment rights.13 This imposition on personal liberty affects every Ameri-
can citizen who carries a cell phone, from the most conscientious and law-
abiding among us to the most hardened criminals on our streets.14 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 (holding that the government did not conduct an unreasonable 
search by acquiring the defendant’s historical CSLI); Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424 (upholding warrant-
less government acquisition of historical CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 518 (holding constitutional gov-
ernment use of the third party doctrine to obtain historical CSLI); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d at 614–15 (approving government collection of historical CSLI without a warrant); Elec. 
Commc’n. Serv., 620 F.3d at 313 (assenting to government acquisition of historical CSLI under the 
low SCA standard); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
RESIDENT POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2014—2014 POPULATION ESTIMATES, AM. FACT-
FINDER (Dec. 2014) (showing populations of states where federal courts have approved warrantless 
collection of CSLI); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS AND U.S. DISTRICT COURTS AS SET FORTH BY 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 81–131 (1999), http://
www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/IJR00007.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY28-DV53] (displaying the 
states that compose each federal circuit). 
 11 In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 603; Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 305. 
 12 See, e.g., Brief for ACLU Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants 
at 15–16, United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4659), 2013 WL 3328019 
(emphasizing that the acquisition of CSLI for a 221-day period is a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment unless the government conducts the acquisition pursuant to a probable cause warrant); En Banc 
Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 4, United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-12928), 2014 WL 7006395 (arguing that a probable 
cause search warrant should be required for law enforcement to access CSLI). 
 13 See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 865–66 (Mass. 2014) (holding that criminal 
suspects have an objective expectation of privacy in their CSLI that law enforcement’s warrantless 
acquisition of CSLI violates in contravention of the Fourth Amendment); Brian L. Owsley, The 
Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic 
Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 38 (2013) (noting that probable cause should be required for 
the acquisition of CSLI because obtaining precise location information is a significant government 
intrusion). 
 14 Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC, (Aug. 8, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-
tracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/3FEJ-2BDV] (noting that cellular service providers develop a detailed 
database of many Americans’ whereabouts based on their CSLI); Abigail Tracy, While the Supreme 
Court Hesitates on Warrantless Cell Location Data Collection, Your Privacy Remains at Risk, FORBES 
(Oct. 16, 2015, 9:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/10/16/while-the-supreme-court-
hesitates-on-warrantless-cell-location-data-collection-your-privacy-remains-at-risk/ [https://web.
archive.org/web/20160322181311/http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/10/16/while-the-
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this Note argues that law and public policy require legislative and judicial 
reexamination of the federal circuit court decisions allowing acquisition of his-
torical CSLI on a “specific and articulable facts” standard.15 To effect a reex-
amination consonant with the Fourth Amendment, the federal judiciary must 
take two actions.16 First, courts should declare § 2703 of the SCA unconstitu-
tional as applied to the acquisition of historical CSLI.17 Second, courts should 
hold the third party doctrine inapplicable to the disclosure of historical CSLI.18 
Additionally, Congress must establish a statutory probable cause requirement 
for historical CSLI acquisition and must pass legislation that places control 
over CSLI transmission and recording in the hands of cell phone users.19 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence and includes an introduction both to § 2703 of the SCA and to the third 
party doctrine.20 Part II discusses how four Courts of Appeals have applied the 
SCA and the third party doctrine to law enforcement requests for historical 
CSLI.21 Part III suggests that Congress should replace § 2703 with legislation 
that requires probable cause to access historical CSLI and consent by cellular 
subscribers for collection of their CSLI.22 Part III also argues that § 2703 of the 
SCA should be struck down because it violates the Fourth Amendment as ap-
plied to historical CSLI requests.23 Finally, this Note concludes that the U.S. 
Supreme Court should both reform the third party doctrine for the modern era 
and hold that cell phone users have an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their historical CSLI.24 
                                                                                                                           
supreme-court-hesitates-on-warrantless-cell-location-data-collection-your-privacy-remains-at-risk/
#3523cd11738e] (emphasizing that cellular providers collect CSLI on every subscriber). 
 15 See infra notes 162–201 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 162–201 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 174–201 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
 19 See S. 356, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 4, 2015) (Sen-
ate bill establishing a probable cause warrant requirement for historical CSLI); H.R. 283, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (as referred to H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations, Feb. 2, 
2015) (suggesting a probable cause requirement for historical CSLI collection); infra notes 165–173 
and accompanying text (outlining action that Congress should take to safeguard the privacy of cell 
phone users); see also S. 2270, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 
10, 2015) (establishing a weak consent requirement for phone company’s collection of CSLI). 
 20 See infra notes 25–116 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 117–159 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 165–173 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 178–201 and accompanying text. 
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I. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CSLI 
ACQUISITION AND USE 
Over the past century, the U.S. Supreme Court has changed its views of 
Fourth Amendment protections to comport with advances in surveillance tech-
nology.25 This Part provides an introduction to Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, to § 2703 of the SCA, and to the third party doctrine.26 Section A of this 
Part examines the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the evolution 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.27 Section B introduces the third party 
doctrine, which is a special exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement.28 Section C discusses the legislative response to government sur-
veillance.29 Section D examines enacted and pending legislation applicable to 
the discussion of historical CSLI.30 Section E describes how the government 
obtains historical CSLI and uses that information at trial.31 
A. “And No Warrants Shall Issue, but upon Probable Cause”: The Fourth 
Amendment Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment provides the American people with a fundamen-
tal right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.32 To protect this right, the Amendment requires 
law enforcement to acquire a warrant from a neutral magistrate prior to con-
ducting a search or seizure in most cases.33 Warrants issue in accordance with 
the Fourth Amendment only when law enforcement swears or affirms that 
probable cause exists for the requested search or seizure.34 In addition to meet-
ing the probable cause requirement, a valid warrant must describe with particu-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (combining trespass theory with 
ideas of reasonableness annunciated by the Supreme Court in the late 1960s), with Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 466 (1928) (rejecting Fourth Amendment protection for wiretap subject on 
trespass theory). 
26 See infra notes 22–112 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 32–55 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 56–72 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 73–88 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 89–98 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 99–116 and accompanying text. 
 32 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”). 
 33 Id.; see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (recognizing a consent exception to the 
warrant requirement in the context of vehicle searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
454–55 (1971) (holding that searches conducted without prior judicial approval are unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987) (holding that when 
a warrant is required, probable cause is required as well). 
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larity the place to be searched and the people or items that the police seek to 
seize.35 
Courts have recognized several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement.36 Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not require a war-
rant for searches that society views as reasonable.37 More specifically, the war-
rant requirement does not apply when the subject of a search consents, when 
exigent circumstances are present, when illegal items are in plain view of law 
enforcement, and when law enforcement conducts a search incident to arrest.38 
Warrantless searches that do not fall under one of these excepted categories are 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.39 
Under the exclusionary rule, the government generally cannot introduce 
evidence at trial that it obtained through an unlawful search.40 By disallowing 
unlawfully obtained evidence, the exclusionary rule aims to deter future un-
lawful police conduct, and thereby bolsters the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.41 In keeping with the deterrent 
                                                                                                                           
 35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455, 467 (noting that the Fourth Amend-
ment addresses the revolutionary-era concern about government agents rummaging through personal 
belongings by requiring that a warrant particularly describe the items to be seized and recognizing that 
technological developments “have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, 
important”). 
 36 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (describing the plain-view doctrine, by 
which officers can legally seize an object if they have lawful access to the object and if they view it 
from a position where they are lawfully situated); Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (approving consent search-
es); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that a subject may be searched without a 
warrant if the search occurs incident to arrest and the officer seeks to protect his or her own safety or 
safeguard evidence from destruction). 
 37 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150–51 (1947) (observing that law enforcement may 
conduct some searches and seizures, including searches incident to arrest, without a warrant); Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (holding that the Fourth Amendment only bars unreasona-
ble searches and seizures). 
 38 See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (concluding that police can enter a 
home without a warrant in the exigent circumstance raised by their reasonable belief that an occupant 
is seriously injured or threatened with serious injury); Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (establishing plain-
view exception); Jimeno, 500 U.S at 251 (providing for consent exception); Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 
(recognizing exigent circumstances exception). 
 39 See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984) (implying that, absent the presence of 
an excepted circumstance, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable); Steagald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981) (noting that without consent or exigent circumstances, searches are pre-
sumptively unreasonable and require a warrant). 
 40 See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule pre-
cludes use of evidence obtained through an illegal search); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
347 (1974) (explaining that under the exclusionary rule, the government cannot use illegally obtained 
evidence at trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 650 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary rule 
to the states). But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (establishing an exception to 
the exclusionary rule when law enforcement believes in good faith that it is conducting a legal search). 
 41 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (explaining that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to secure 
Fourth Amendment rights by deterring unlawful police conduct); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (noting deter-
rent effect of exclusionary rule). 
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purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
rule does not operate when law enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment 
through good-faith reliance on a faulty warrant.42 Both the Fourth Amendment 
and the exclusionary rule remedy are enforceable at the state level.43 
Over the past century, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
reflected varying degrees of judicial concern for individual privacy.44 The 
Court’s conception of Fourth Amendment protections first expanded, but then 
narrowed during the latter half of the twentieth century.45 Prior to the late 
1960s, the Supreme Court had emphasized that searches involving physical 
trespass against a person or his or her property violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.46 
In 1967, in United States v. Katz, the Supreme Court supplemented the 
physical trespass doctrine by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects in-
dividual privacy.47 The majority opinion written by Justice Stewart left unan-
swered the critical question of precisely when a search that invaded individual 
privacy required law enforcement to obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause.48 Instead, to determine when the Fourth Amendment mandates that law 
enforcement procure a search warrant, courts apply the reasonableness test 
established in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz: a person must have “ex-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (recognizing good faith exception to exclusionary rule). In 1984, in 
United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court determined that the exclusionary rule has no deterrent effect 
against officers who acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant, and therefore ruled that the rule should 
not be applied in cases when such good-faith reliance occurred. Id. at 919–20. 
 43 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary 
rule is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment because the rule is essential 
to a scheme of ordered liberty. Id. 
 44 Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (augmenting the trespass theory with 
the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) 
(determining that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places”), with Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 
457, 466 (holding that because a wiretap did not constitute physical trespass, no Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (linking Fourth Amendment 
protections to the sanctity of a person’s home and private property). 
 45 Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (announcing the rule of reasonableness by holding that “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”), with Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457, 466 (affirming the 
trespass theory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by ruling that a warrantless wiretap does not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 46 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457, 466 (refusing to recognize a warrantless wiretap as a Fourth 
Amendment violation); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) (focusing on the unreason-
able nature of searching a home or office without a warrant); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasizing the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection of home and private property). 
 47 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that the government violated the expectation of privacy on 
which the defendant reasonably relied when it listened to his conversation in a closed telephone 
booth). 
 48 Id. at 352; see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 821 (2004) (noting that Justice Stewart’s 
opinion does not set out a test to determine when the Constitution requires law enforcement to obtain 
a warrant). 
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hibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and that expectation 
must be one that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”49  
The Supreme Court today recognizes that law enforcement may violate 
the Fourth Amendment through physical trespass or through activity that in-
fringes on a person’s objective expectation of privacy.50 Katz’s progeny recog-
nize the threat that technological advances pose to individuals.51 Some of these 
decisions invoke Fourth Amendment protections by combining the rule of rea-
sonableness with trespass theory.52 In two such Supreme Court cases, Kyllo v. 
United States and United States v. Karo, law enforcement used invasive tech-
nology to gain information about the interior of the defendants’ homes.53 The 
Court determined in each case that the government violated the defendant’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy by affecting a functional trespass against 
him through the intrusive use of technology.54 The Court ruled in both cases 
that the government could not track an individual within his or her home with-
out a warrant.55 
B. Voluntary Exposure: The Third Party Doctrine 
Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court established that individuals do not retain 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in information that they voluntarily convey 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 340–41 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (following Justice 
Harlan’s reasonableness test from Katz); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (reaffirming 
the Katz reasonableness test as articulated by Justice Harlan); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (suggesting that the Supreme Court recognizes Fourth Amendment 
arguments grounded on either trespass theory or the rule of reasonableness); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 
(determining that a person enjoys greater Fourth Amendment protection within the home); Katz, 389 
U.S. at 361 (implying that trespass theory remains operative because the rule of reasonableness arises 
from prior decisions). 
 51 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (observing that new technologies can 
send reasonable expectations of privacy into flux); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (expressing fear that use of 
new thermal imaging technology without sensible limitations would diminish the Fourth Amend-
ment’s privacy protections); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (determining that the use 
of emerging technologies involves the Fourth Amendment). 
 52 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 (discussing the intimate relationship between the trespass and 
reasonableness theories); Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 66 (1992) (holding that the plain-
view exception is applicable only if law enforcement did not engage in a trespass while viewing the 
contraband). 
 53 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29 (noting that Department of the Interior agents used a thermal imager 
to determine whether the defendant was using grow lamps for marijuana within his home); Karo, 468 
U.S. at 709–10 (explaining that Drug and Enforcement Agency agents used a radio beeper to deter-
mine that the defendant placed and maintained a can of drug precursor within his home). 
 54 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (concluding that the use of a thermal imager to obtain otherwise pri-
vate information about a home invades private space, and accordingly works an unreasonable search); 
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–16 (holding that the use of a beeper violates a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy because it reveals information that law enforcement could not gain through unaided observation 
from outside the curtilage of a home). 
 55 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15. 
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to third parties.56 The Court later applied the Katz standard to third party dis-
closures.57 Specifically, the Court found that individuals have a diminished 
expectation of privacy when they voluntarily convey information to third par-
ties.58 By making a voluntary disclosure to a third party, a person assumes the 
risk that the third party will, in turn, disclose that information to the govern-
ment.59 
With its landmark 1979 decision in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
named and further refined the third party doctrine.60 Smith focused on whether 
law enforcement could acquire records of the telephone numbers that Smith, 
the defendant, had dialed from his telephone company without a warrant based 
on probable cause.61 Smith’s telephone company had allowed the police to 
place a pen register at the company’s offices for the purpose of recording the 
numbers dialed on Smith’s home telephone.62 At trial in Maryland state court, 
Smith moved to suppress the numbers that law enforcement collected from the 
pen register because the police did so without a warrant.63 The trial court de-
nied Smith’s motion on the ground that law enforcement’s collection of busi-
ness records from a third party does not require a warrant based on probable 
cause to comply with the Fourth Amendment.64 
Smith appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and 
affirmed the conviction.65 The Court held that a person has no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in information that the person voluntarily surrenders to a 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437–38 (1963) (deciding that no Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred when the government listened to a conversation between petitioner and a wired 
informant); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751–52 (1952) (holding that the government did 
not violate petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights by listening to a conversation that he had with a 
wired informant). 
 57 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (observing no objective expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily transferred to a third party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
442 (1976) (concluding, based on Katz, that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information, such 
as business records, that someone knowingly exposes to a third party). 
 58 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (deciding that because Smith’s telephone company created a record 
of the numbers that he dialed in the course of ordinary business, the assumption of risk doctrine ap-
plied); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (holding that because bank records are business documents that a 
person voluntarily transferred to a third party, the person assumed the risk that the bank would share 
those records with the government). 
 59 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. 
 60 442 U.S. at 743–44; Tim Sheehan, Note, Taking the Third-Party Doctrine Too Far: Why Cell 
Phone Tracking Data Deserves Fourth Amendment Protection, 13 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 188–
89 (2015) (noting that Smith recognized a “broad third-party rule”). 
 61 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
 62 Id. at 737. A pen register records dialing information transmitted by telephone but does not 
capture the contents of any telephone conversation. 18 U.S.C § 3127(3) (2012). 
 63 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737–38. 
 64 Id. 
65 Id. at 738, 745–46. 
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third party.66 The Court observed that telephone users know they must convey 
the numbers they dial to their phone companies and also know that their phone 
companies record that information for business purposes.67 Given the 
knowledge of these practices that society imputed to Smith, society would 
view Smith’s expectation of privacy in his dialing information as unreasona-
ble.68 The Supreme Court reasoned that Smith failed Justice Harlan’s reasona-
bleness test because he lacked an objective expectation of privacy in his dial-
ing information.69 
Since the Supreme Court decided Smith, third party doctrine jurispru-
dence has not changed substantially on the federal level.70 State courts and 
some federal judges, however, have questioned, and in some cases completely 
disavowed, the third party doctrine.71 These judicial pronouncements have led 
some academic commentators to conclude that the Supreme Court will have to 
reconsider the third party doctrine in the near future.72 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 738, 743–45. 
 67 Id. at 743; see Ryan Merkel, Note, Playing Hide and Seek with Big Brother: Law Enforce-
ment’s Use of Historical and Real Time Mobile Device Data, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 429, 437–38 
(2015) (noting that the defendant in Smith assumed the risk that his phone company would turn over 
his dialing information to the government because he voluntarily exposed that information to the 
phone company). 
 68 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. Some commentators think that the Supreme Court should have formu-
lated the third party doctrine as an issue of consent. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-
Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 588–89 (2009) (arguing that disclosures to third parties do 
not waive reasonable expectations of privacy, but rather take the form of consent to searches that are 
unreasonable). 
 69 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; see Sheehan, supra note 60, at 188–89 (observing that because Smith 
knew that his telephone company recorded the number that he dialed, he had no subjective expectation 
of privacy in his dialing information). 
 70 See Kerr, supra note 68, at 569 (noting that the Supreme Court decided its final case on the 
third party doctrine in 1980). 
 71 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that new technologies may 
necessitate judicial reconsideration of the third party doctrine); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 522–
23 (Fla. 2014) (declining to apply the third party doctrine to case involving transmission of a defend-
ant’s CSLI from his phone company to the government because the defendant could not reasonably be 
construed to have voluntarily transmitted his CSLI to the phone company); Commonwealth v. Augus-
tine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 859 (Mass. 2014) (concluding on state constitutional grounds that technological 
developments have rendered the third party doctrine obsolete). 
 72 See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party 
Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 51 (2011) (predicting that lower court cases and technological 
advances will cause the Supreme Court to overturn the third party doctrine if a case involving the 
doctrine reaches the Court); Shaun B. Spencer, The Aggregation Principle and the Future of Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 289, 291 (2015) (reason-
ing that because judicial decisions on the third party doctrine in the lower courts have been more at 
odds with each other since the Supreme Court’s Jones decision, a national movement to update the 
third party doctrine may gain traction). 
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C. Congress Responds to Increased Government Surveillance: The 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and Its Progeny 
Emerging surveillance technology inspired Congress to enact privacy pro-
tections in addition to those that the Supreme Court provided through its ruling 
in Katz.73 Congress reacted to expansive government use of listening devices 
in the Katz era by passing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (“Wiretap Act”).74 The Wiretap Act, as amended in 1986, prevents the 
government from intercepting voice communications transmitted over a com-
mon carrier without first obtaining a court order.75 
A law enforcement agent seeking such an order, which is the functional 
equivalent of a warrant, must apply in writing and under oath to a judge re-
sponsible for the territorial jurisdiction in question.76 The application must 
contain particularized facts about the communication that the agent seeks to 
intercept.77 Upon review of the agent’s application, the judge may issue an or-
der under the Wiretap Act if the agent’s application meets one of four condi-
tions.78 Two of these conditions call for a finding of probable cause.79 By re-
quiring both particularized facts and a finding of probable cause to obtain a 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (responding to Katz by instituting a probable cause requirement 
for wiretaps); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 17–18 (1986) (expressing Congress’s concern about emerging 
surveillance technologies). The Chicago Tribune reported in 1965 that the Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure found that the government could place a listening 
device in a martini olive. William Moore, Snoopers Can ‘Bug’ Olive in Martini, Probers Learn, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 19, 1965, § 1, at 4. 
 74 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511; H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 17–18 (explaining Congress’s decision to 
enact the Wiretap Act in response to modern surveillance technologies and practices). 
 75 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 17. But see Hutton v. Woodall, 70 F. Supp. 
3d 1235, 1240 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding § 2511(1)(a) of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act un-
constitutional as applied to a purely local communication that never implicated interstate commerce). 
 76 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). 
 77 Id. § 2518(1)(b). 
 78 Id. § 2518(3). These conditions include: 
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or 
is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter; (b) 
there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that of-
fense will be obtained through such interception; (c) normal investigative procedures 
have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
to be too dangerous; (d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause 
for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic 
communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connec-
tion with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or 
commonly used by such person. 
Id. § 2518(3)(a)–(d). 
 79 Id. § 2518(3)(a)–(b), (d). 
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Wiretap Act court order, Congress reemphasized the constitutional warrant 
requirement for federal law enforcement agencies’ wiretaps.80 
The advent of electronic communications independent of common carri-
ers enabled law enforcement to circumvent the Wiretap Act’s Fourth Amend-
ment protections by the mid-1980s.81 To safeguard the public against unauthor-
ized interception of private electronic communications, Congress amended title 
III of the Wiretap Act in 1986.82 The amendment, the SCA, established proce-
dures that provide judicial oversight for government surveillance of electronic 
communications.83 Congress explicitly intended for the SCA to govern cellular 
telephone communications.84 
The SCA provides less protection to cell phone users than the Wiretap Act 
provides to landline users.85 Significantly, § 2703 of the SCA does not require 
law enforcement to show probable cause when an agency seeks to obtain a 
cellular customer’s communications or records.86 Instead, the SCA requires 
law enforcement to secure a court order based on a showing of specific and 
articulable facts demonstrating reasonable grounds to think that the requested 
records are germane to an ongoing criminal inquiry.87 Congress explained that 
the SCA represents a balance between law enforcement interests and the indi-
vidual’s expectation of privacy, indicating that Congress intended to lower the 
justification required for a § 2703 order from one of probable cause to one of 
specific and articulable facts.88 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring probable cause for a warrant to issue); Susan Freiwald, 
Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 24–25 (2004) 
(explaining that the Wiretap Act drafters sought to accommodate Supreme Court precedent by requir-
ing a Fourth Amendment probable cause standard for law enforcement to conduct wiretaps). 
 81 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3 (1986) (observing that developments in surveillance technology 
required new legislation ensuring that citizens could continue to enjoy Wiretap Act privacy protec-
tions). 
 82 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2703 (2012); S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (declaring that Congress drafted 
the Stored Communications Act to safeguard personal privacy). 
 83 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 n.1 (2004) (noting that com-
mentators refer to Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act as the Stored Communica-
tions Act). 
 84 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3; H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 20–21. 
 85 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (allowing a court order to issue on a showing of specific and articu-
lable facts), with id. § 2518 (requiring a warrant based upon a showing of probable cause). 
 86 See id. § 2703(d) (lacking a probable cause requirement). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (discussing the balance that Congress intended to institute through 
its enactment of § 2703). 
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D. Probable Cause and Voluntariness: Congressional Efforts to  
Protect Cell Phone Users’ CSLI 
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals articulated in In re U.S. for an Or-
der Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose 
Records to the Government in 2010, it is Congress’s role to adjust § 2703 after 
weighing citizens’ privacy concerns and law enforcement authorities’ legiti-
mate requirements.89 
Senators and members of Congress partially responded to the rulings of 
the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals by introducing the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015 
(“ECPAAA”) in both houses of Congress.90 The ECPAAA institutes a probable 
cause requirement for governmental entities seeking to compel an electronic 
communication service provider, such as a telephone company, to disclose the 
content of a message.91 Notably, the ECPAAA does not provide guidance to 
the courts regarding CSLI because the Act does not state whether Congress 
considers CSLI to be content or simply routing material.92 At the time of this 
writing, the ECPAAA was under consideration by both the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the House Committee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Securi-
ty, and Investigations.93 
                                                                                                                           
 89 620 F.3d at 319. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits largely agreed with the Third Circuit, stress-
ing that only Congress can change historical CSLI court order requirements. See Davis, 785 F.3d at 
512 (reminding litigants that only Congress can change the SCA); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d at 614 (holding that the SCA comprises an appropriate response to emerging technology); Re-
forming the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
114th Cong. 30 (2015) [hereinafter Reforming the ECPA Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that Congress must strike a balance between the 
needs of law enforcement and privacy interests). 
 90 See S. 356, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 4, 2015) (add-
ing a probable cause requirement for acquisition of message content); H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(as referred to H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations) (requiring law 
enforcement to have a probable cause warrant before obtaining message content from a service pro-
vider). Members of Congress introduced, but failed to pass, legislation similar to the ECPAAA in both 
2012 and 2013. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, S. 607, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Electronic Communications Privacy Act Modernization Act of 2012, H.R. 6339, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
 91 S. 356 § 3(a); H.R. 283 § 3(a). 
 92 See S. 356 (lacking specific language regarding application to historical CSLI); H.R. 283 (fail-
ing to address whether bill considers historical CSLI to be message content); S. REP. NO. 113-34, at 
14 (2013) (noting that in an identical version of the ECPAAA introduced in the 113th Congress, Con-
gress did not take a position as to whether the Act would require law enforcement to show probable 
cause before obtaining a § 2703 court order). 
 93 All Bill Information (Except Text) for S.356—Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amend-
ments Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/356/all-
info [https://perma.cc/P4BH-X9RP]; Congress, All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.283—
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/283/all-info [https://perma.cc/J7YX-AVAC]. 
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In addition to the ECPAAA, the Senate also is considering the Location 
Privacy Protection Act of 2015 (“LPPA”).94 The LPPA would require that cell 
phone users provide affirmative consent before service providers could collect 
their geolocation information.95 To protect public safety, the LPPA’s drafter, 
Senator Franken of Minnesota, included several exceptions to this require-
ment.96 Like the ECPAAA, Congress has failed to pass the LPPA in multiple 
sessions.97 The LPPA also remains under the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
consideration.98 
E. Putting It on the Map: Acquiring Historical CSLI and  
Using CSLI at Trial 
Law enforcement obtains historical CSLI through a SCA § 2703 court or-
der that it may later use at trial.99 In Davis, the government applied to a federal 
magistrate for a § 2703 court order to compel the defendant’s cellular service 
provider, MetroPCS, to disclose historical CSLI associated with the defend-
ant’s cellular telephone number.100 The government limited its request to CSLI 
from the period beginning August 1, 2010 and ending October 6, 2010.101 Ac-
cording to the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc, no party disputed that the gov-
ernment met the § 2703 court order standard by submitting specific and articu-
lable facts establishing reasonable grounds to believe that Davis’s historical 
                                                                                                                           
 94 S. 2270, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 10, 2015). 
 95 See id. § 3(a)–(b) (requiring cell phone service providers to obtain affirmative consent from 
subscribers before collecting their geolocation information). The LPPA defines geolocation infor-
mation as information sufficient to ascertain the physical address of a device. Id. § 3(a). 
 96 See id. § 3(b)(2)(C) (including public safety exceptions to the LPPA’s general consent re-
quirement); Bradley W. Guyton, Updated Location Privacy Protection Act Introduced, PRIVACY & 
SEC. L. BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.privsecblog.com/2014/04/articles/marketing-and-consumer-
privacy/updated-location-privacy-protection-act-introduced/ [https://perma.cc/X5WB-8VPV] (report-
ing that Senator Franken sought to protect public safety by including exceptions to the LPPA’s con-
sent requirement when he wrote the Act). 
 97 S. 2171, 113th Cong. (2014) (as reported to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 27, 2014); S. 
1223, 112th Cong. (2012) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 17, 2012). 
 98 All Bill Information (Except Text) for S. 2270 - Location Privacy Protection Act of 2015, CON-
GRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2270/all-info [https://perma.cc/
DND7-LXVH]. 
 99 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 343–44 (noting that the government acquired the defendant’s histor-
ical CSLI pursuant to a § 2703 court order); Davis, 785 F.3d at 502 (stating that the government ob-
tained a § 2703 court order before acquiring the defendant’s historical CSLI). 
 100 See Order for Stored Cell Site Information at 1, United States v. Reid, et. al, No. 1:10-cr-
20896 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2012), ECF No. 266-1 (noting that the government requested an order for 
the defendant’s historical CSLI). 
 101 Id. at 2. This time interval corresponded to the period during which Davis committed the crimes 
for which he was charged. See Davis, 785 F.3d at 500 (stating that the government charged the defend-
ant with a series of crimes that were committed between August and October 2010). 
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CSLI would be material to an ongoing criminal investigation.102 The federal 
magistrate issued the § 2703 order and MetroPCS complied.103 
At trial in Davis and in Graham, the government used the historical CSLI 
that the defendants’ cellular providers disclosed to place the defendants at the 
scenes of several of the armed robberies for which the juries later convicted 
them.104 In Davis, a custodian of records for MetroPCS first testified that the 
company created and retained toll records encompassing CSLI during the 
normal course of business.105 The custodian also explained some cellular net-
work basics; he stated that each cellular tower had a range of one-and-a-half 
miles and had a coverage area that is broken into either three or six sectors.106 
After the MetroPCS custodian provided his introduction to cellular network 
operations, the government called a detective from the Miami-Dade Police 
Department to interpret evidence maps that he had created using Davis’s 
CSLI.107 The detective noted that during the time of the robberies, cell towers 
in the areas where the robberies occurred routed calls placed and received by 
Davis and his co-conspirators.108 The government relied on this information to 
argue that Davis was at least near the robbery locations when the robberies 
happened.109 
Davis, Graham, and their attorneys recognized the damaging nature of the 
government’s historical CSLI evidence prior to Davis and Graham’s respective 
trials.110 Before their trials, Graham and Davis moved to suppress the historical 
CSLI that the government obtained by § 2703 orders on the ground that the 
government conducted a search under the Fourth Amendment when it obtained 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Davis, 785 F.3d at 502. 
 103 Id. at 500, 502; Order for Stored Cell Site Information, supra note 100, at 1–2. MetroPCS 
provided the government with information including the date, time, and length of Davis’s calls; the cell 
tower that connected each call that Davis placed and received; and the sector of the cell tower’s coverage 
area in which Davis was located during each call. Davis, 785 F.3d at 500, 502. 
 104 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 351; Davis, 785 F.3d at 504. 
 105 Davis, 785 F.3d at 503. The government likely elicited testimony on MetroPCS’s collection of 
CSLI as a business record both to avoid the hearsay bar and to present or preserve a third party doc-
trine argument under Smith. See 442 U.S. at 743–44 (applying third party doctrine to business rec-
ords); Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–12 (noting that a MetroPCS custodian of records testified as to the fact 
that MetroPCS collects historical CSLI as a business record). 
 106 Davis, 785 F.3d at 503. Additionally, the custodian acknowledged that the coverage range of any 
tower in an urban location such as Miami could be smaller than that of a typical tower, but did not pro-
vide a specific coverage range of an ordinary urban tower. Id. 
 107 Id. at 504. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 502. 
 110 See Defendant Davis’s Motion to Suppress Electronic Location Evidence at 1, United States v. 
Davis, No. 1:10-cr-20896 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2012), ECF No. 272 (seeking to exclude defendant’s 
historical CSLI from admission at trial); Motion to Suppress Tangible and Derivative Evidence - 
Cellphone Data and Historical Cell Site Location Data at 1, United States v. Graham, No. 1:11-cr-
00094 (D. Md. July 28, 2011), ECF No. 38 (arguing for exclusion of defendant’s historical CSLI at 
trial). 
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their CSLI.111 The court in each case denied the defendant’s motion, allowing 
the prosecution to introduce the CSLI.112 At least in part on the basis of Davis’s 
historical CSLI, the jury convicted Davis of seven armed robberies.113 
Appeals in cases that turn on suppression or allowance of historical CSLI 
evidence such as Davis frequently focus on the constitutionality of § 2703.114 
Davis adhered to this pattern by arguing on appeal that the SCA’s lack of a 
probable cause requirement rendered the Act unconstitutional as applied to his 
case.115 Additionally, Davis contended on appeal that applying the third party 
doctrine to his case violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasona-
ble search and seizure.116 
II. SEARCHES AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE: THE VIEWS OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
Five federal Courts of Appeals have ruled on the issue of whether the 
government violates a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when 
law enforcement obtains historical CSLI with a § 2703 court order instead of 
with a warrant based on probable cause.117 All five Courts of Appeals held that 
the Fourth Amendment allows acquisition of historical CSLI through the § 
2703 process.118 One Court of Appeals panel, which was later overruled en 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Defendant Davis’s Motion to Suppress Electronic Location Evidence, supra note 110, at 8; 
Motion to Suppress Tangible and Derivative Evidence, supra note 110, at 4. 
 112 Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Suppress Evidence at 2, United States v. Graham, No. 
1:11-cr-00094 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2012), ECF. No. 84; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
Electronic Location Evidence, United States v. Davis, No. 10-20896 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF 
No. 276. 
 113 Davis, 785 F.3d at 505; Jury Verdict, supra note 1, at 1–5. 
 114 See Graham I, 796 U.S. at 342–43, 351 (probing the defendant’s argument that § 2703 is un-
constitutional and that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 
505. 
 115 Davis, 785 F.3d at 505. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (deciding that the govern-
ment did not conduct an unreasonable search by acquiring the defendant’s historical CSLI); United 
States v. Graham (Graham I), 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g, 824 F.3d 421, 421 
(4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Graham II) (determining that the government violated the Fourth Amend-
ment when it obtained the defendant’s historical CSLI using a § 2703 court order); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (holding that 
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure was not violated when 
the government acquired his historical CSLI with a § 2703 court order); In re Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (observing that the government constitutionally obtained the 
defendant’s historical CSLI when it applied for and received a § 2703 court order); In re Order Direct-
ing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 
2010) [hereinafter Elec. Commc’n Serv.] (approving the use of a § 2703 court order to acquire the 
defendant’s historical CSLI). 
 118 Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424; Davis, 785 F.3d at 500; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
at 613; Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 313. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Davis and the 
Fifth Circuit in In re Historical Cell Site Data expressly held that cell phone users do not have a rea-
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banc, determined that law enforcement acquisition of historical CSLI under § 
2703 is an unreasonable search and that the third party doctrine does not apply 
to historical CSLI.119 This Part discusses the views of the federal Courts of 
Appeals on the topic of whether the Fourth Amendment requires probable 
cause for historical CSLI acquisition.120 Section A discusses the reasoning of 
the courts that held specific and articulable facts searches consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.121 Section B presents the Fourth Circuit panel’s determi-
nation that such searches should be unconstitutional.122 
A. When Is a Search Unreasonable? The Courts of Appeals on Expectations 
of Privacy and Trespass Doctrine 
The Courts of Appeals diverge in their views of whether law enforcement 
conducts an unreasonable search when it acquires historical CSLI through the 
§ 2703 process that requires a lower constitutional justification than probable 
cause.123 Four federal Courts of Appeals and some academic commentators 
posit that law enforcement conducts a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment when it obtains historical CSLI through a § 2703 order.124 To 
begin their analysis, these courts either explicitly noted or alluded to the fact 
                                                                                                                           
sonable expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI and that even if they did have such an expecta-
tion, they forfeit it by voluntarily conveying CSLI to their phone companies. Davis, 785 F.3d at 511; 
In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613–14. In In re Order Directing a Provider of Electronic 
Communication Services to Disclose Records to the Government, the Third Circuit did not reach the 
third party question, but dispensed with a probable cause requirement for CSLI collection in favor of 
the specific and articulable facts standard in § 2703. 620 F.3d at 313. 
 119 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45. 
 120 See infra notes 123–159 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 123–132 and accompanying text. 
 122 See infra notes 133–159 and accompanying text. 
 123 Compare Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45 (holding that the government conducts an unreasona-
ble search when it allows law enforcement to procure historical CSLI without a warrant), with Davis, 
785 F.3d at 518 (determining that a search did not occur when law enforcement accessed the defend-
ant’s historical CSLI by § 2703 order), and Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 319 (enabling magis-
trates to require a warrant should the privacy interests of the defendant outweigh the government’s 
need for the historical CSLI). 
 124 See Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424; Davis, 785 F.3d at 500; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d at 615; Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 313; M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 
41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1457 (2007) (arguing that no search occurs when law enforcement obtains 
CSLI that tracks a subject outside of a residence or private place); Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, 
Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable 
Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1787–88 (2009) (noting the argument that law en-
forcement conducts a reasonable search by obtaining historical CSLI by court order because historical 
CSLI provides no greater level of surveillance than officers could conduct with their own senses). 
Analogizing to the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in United States v. Miller, at least one practitioner has 
argued that using a cell phone is just as voluntary an action as the one that Miller took when he used the 
banking system. 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976); Clark, supra, at 1470–71. Just as the government collected 
Miller’s bank records from his financial institution, so too can the government collect a criminal suspect’s 
historical CSLI from his cellular provider. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44; Clark, supra, at 1470–71. 
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that the Fourth Amendment only proscribes warrantless searches that are un-
reasonable.125 The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits then went on to reason 
that cell phone subscribers do not have an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their historical CSLI.126 To support this reasoning, the courts de-
termined that the governmental interest in apprehending and punishing the de-
fendants clearly outweighed the personal privacy interest that the defendants 
had in their historical CSLI.127 
In addition to applying the reasonableness balancing test, the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits also held that, under a third party doctrine analy-
sis, the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical 
CSLI.128 The Graham II, Davis, and In re Historical Cell Site Data courts all 
determined that historical CSLI is a business record.129 Then, the courts pro-
ceeded to apply the third party doctrine according to their interpretation of Mil-
ler and Smith.130 In 2013, in In re Historical Cell Site Data, the Fifth Circuit 
decided that cell phone subscribers voluntarily convey their CSLI to their cel-
lular providers, but the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly address the voluntar-
iness pillar of the Smith analysis in its Davis opinion.131 The Graham II, Davis, 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 516 (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
warrantless searches); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (stating that Fourth Amendment 
protections extend only to reasonable expectations of privacy); see also Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 
F.3d at 312–13 (declining to decide whether CSLI unreasonably impinges on privacy interests, citing 
a dearth of facts). 
 126 See Graham II, 824 F.3d at 428 (holding that suspects have no objectively reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 517–18 (deciding that Davis’s expectation of priva-
cy was unreasonable because the government’s interest in apprehending him outweighed his interest 
in personal privacy); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614–15 (affirming the balancing of 
personal privacy and governmental interest that Congress conducted in drafting the SCA as reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 127 Graham II, 824 F.3d at 428; Davis, 785 F.3d at 518; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
at 614–15. 
 128 See Graham II, 824 F.3d at 427 (declining to decide that the defendant had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his historical CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 511 (stating that Davis had no objec-
tive expectation of privacy in his cell provider’s business records); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d at 614–15 (holding that by passing § 2703, Congress created a solution, as Justice Alito coun-
seled in Jones, that balanced an individual’s expectation of privacy in business records with the gov-
ernmental interest in apprehending criminals). 
 129 Graham II, 824 F.3d at 427; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
at 611. 
 130 Graham II, 824 F.3d at 427; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511 (determining that Supreme Court prece-
dent, including Miller and Smith, compelled the conclusion that the government did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when it obtained Davis’s historical CSLI with a § 2703 court order); In re Histor-
ical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (reasoning that, per Miller, the phone company owned the defend-
ant’s historical CSLI, and, per Smith, such routing information is not protected under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 131 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–12 (implying that because the telephone user in Smith necessarily 
revealed his location by using a landline, he voluntarily conveyed location information to his tele-
phone company); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 612 (concluding that cell phone users 
convey CSLI to their phone companies voluntarily). 
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and In re Historical Cell Site Data courts held that cell phone subscribers have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy from the government in the CSLI that 
they transfer to their phone companies.132 
B. Historical CSLI Collection Without Probable Cause as an  
Unreasonable Search 
The Graham panel majority, Davis dissent, and many academic commen-
tators disagree with the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, and instead take 
the view that law enforcement’s historical CSLI collection in the absence of 
probable cause is an unreasonable search.133 The Graham panel and the Davis 
dissent found that people have an objectively reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in their historical CSLI.134 The dissent in Davis and the Graham panel ma-
jority also held the third party doctrine inapplicable to government acquisition 
and inspection of historical CSLI.135 
Judges who think that historical CSLI collection in the absence of proba-
ble cause constitutes an unreasonable search focus on two factors to substanti-
ate their view: the locations at which historical CSLI can place a suspect and 
the length of time for which the government requests and inspects historical 
CSLI.136 Judge Martin, dissenting in Davis, expressed her explicit concern that 
the Davis majority had provided the government with a powerful, intrusive 
tool that could determine a suspect’s location with remarkable specificity.137 
For Judge Martin and her colleagues, the ability for historical CSLI to reveal a 
suspect’s patterns of movement is of critical importance because such patterns 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Graham II, 824 F.3d at 428; Davis, 785 F.3d at 512, 513; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d at 610. 
 133 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45 (requiring law enforcement to procure a probable cause 
warrant to obtain and inspect historical CSLI that covers an extended period of time); Davis, 785 F.3d 
at 541 (Martin, J., dissenting) (determining that because the defendant had an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his historical CSLI, a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when law en-
forcement obtained and inspected it without a warrant); Patrick E. Corbett, The Fourth Amendment 
and Cell Site Location Information: What Should We Do While We Wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 215, 226 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court likely will find the warrantless acquisi-
tion of historical CSLI to be a Fourth Amendment violation, but will allow the government to avoid 
suppression through the use of exclusionary rule exceptions). 
 134 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 345; Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 135 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 353; Davis, 785 F.3d at 538 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 136 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 346–47, 350 (holding that the government violates a person’s pri-
vacy by viewing CSLI that tracks them to their home and that the government conducts an unreasona-
ble search when it inspects historical CSLI for a period longer than two weeks); Elec. Commc’n Serv., 
620 F.3d at 312 (acknowledging the possibility that historical CSLI can resemble a tracking device 
that reveals a suspect’s prior location). 
 137 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 541–42 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that due to the specificity of 
the CSLI that the government obtained, Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI). 
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can track people to and within their homes.138 They cite the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in United States v. Karo, Kyllo v. United States, and United States v. 
Jones to substantiate their view that the Fourth Amendment prohibits law en-
forcement from placing an individual in his or her home at a certain time.139 
Additionally, those who think that the government must obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause in order to access and inspect historical CSLI also 
take issue with the lengthy time periods for which the government may gain 
access to historical CSLI under a § 2703 order.140 One commentator notes that 
courts must answer two questions: how long a period of surveillance must last 
to provide intimate details of a suspect’s life and the amount of time after 
which law enforcement would be incapable of conducting the surveillance by 
conventional means.141 
Judges generally hesitate to provide a specific answer for the two ques-
tions posed above regarding the acceptable length of time for which law en-
forcement may obtain historical CSLI absent a finding of probable cause.142 
The Graham panel, however, responded to both questions by finding that the 
government violates the Fourth Amendment when it obtains location infor-
mation not available to the general public that covers a period such as fourteen 
or 221 days.143 Like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Graham panel did not 
provide a floor indicating the time period covered by historical CSLI records 
that would be acceptable for law enforcement to procure without showing 
probable cause.144 One may infer from each of the U.S. Court of Appeals opin-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 346–47 (discussing sanctity of the home); Davis, 785 F.3d at 540–
41 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that historical CSLI could reveal the place where Davis lived and 
slept). 
 139 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 346–47 (noting that all information about a suspect within the home is 
private because the suspect can reasonably expect that information to be free from government sur-
veillance); Davis, 785 F.3d at 540–41 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 140 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 540–41 (Martin, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the 11,606 
CSLI data points that the government received from a period of sixty-seven days revealed intimate, 
private details about his habits); Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 311 (acknowledging that historical 
CSLI can reveal a person’s home to the government); Spencer, supra note 72, at 301 (concluding that 
the aggregation of CSLI presents a new Fourth Amendment challenge that courts must address). 
 141 Spencer, supra note 140, at 293. 
 142 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 540 (Martin, J., dissenting) (opining that the sixty-seven days of Da-
vis’s historical CSLI that the government obtained was enough to reveal private information about 
him); Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 311 (noting, without further detail, that historical CSLI can 
place a person at his or her home). 
 143 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 349–50 (citing Karo, Kyllo, and Riley to substantiate the holding 
that historical CSLI is not in public use, and as such, law enforcement violates a suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy if CSLI is obtained for an extended period of time); Spencer, supra note 140, at 
293. 
 144 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 349–50; see also Davis, 785 F.3d at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting) (con-
cluding that the government violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by acquiring sixty-
seven days of his CSLI without a warrant); Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 311 (recognizing only 
that historical CSLI can reveal private details of a suspect’s existence). 
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ions that hold or would hold acquisition of historical CSLI on a specific and 
articulable facts standard unconstitutional that any time period that would re-
veal intimate personal details about a suspect is a period that requires a finding 
of probable cause.145 
In addition to concluding that suspects have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their historical CSLI, the Graham panel and the Davis dissent both 
vigorously asserted that a suspect could not lose that expectation by operation 
of the third party doctrine.146 The Davis dissent and the Graham panel argued 
that the third party doctrine is inapplicable to historical CSLI cases for three 
reasons: people do not voluntarily convey their CSLI to their cellular provid-
ers, the Supreme Court has suggested that individuals do not lose their entire 
expectation of privacy in information that they expose to third parties, and 
people expose so much information about themselves to their phone compa-
nies that they must retain some privacy interest in that information.147 
The judges who support a probable cause requirement focus on the view 
that cell phone users involuntarily transmit CSLI, because if such transmis-
sions are involuntary, then the government cannot reasonably acquire them 
under the Supreme Court’s 1979 Smith v. Maryland decision.148 The Graham 
panel and Davis dissent observed that cell phone users do not ordinarily enter 
their location into their phones.149 The Graham panel went further, stating that 
cell phone users do not even convey location information to their service pro-
viders at all because service providers automatically generate CSLI.150 Without 
voluntary transmission of CSLI, Judge Davis opined in his Graham panel 
opinion, a suspect never assumes the risk that his or her cellular provider will 
turn his or her CSLI over to the government, and accordingly maintains a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in that information.151 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 348 (holding that long-term CSLI searches implicate privacy inter-
ests); Davis, 785 F.3d at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the government could 
access private information about suspects by acquiring their historical CSLI); Elec. Commc’n Serv., 
620 F.3d at 311 (noting that the government can access critical information about a suspect’s habits by 
obtaining his or her historical CSLI). 
 146 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 353 (concluding that the third party doctrine is inapplicable to the 
defendant’s case); Davis, 785 F.3d at 538 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that applying the third party 
doctrine to the defendant’s case is inappropriate due to the advance of technology since the Supreme 
Court decided Miller and Smith). 
 147 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 354–60; Davis, 785 F.3d at 534–37 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 148 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 353; Davis, 785 F.3d at 534 (Martin, J., dissenting); see Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (requiring that the suspect voluntarily transfer information to a service 
provider for the third party doctrine to apply). 
 149 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355; Davis, 785 F.3d at 534 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 150 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 354. 
 151 Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 68, at 588–89 (arguing that courts should center their third party 
doctrine inquiries on the question of whether defendants consented to release of their private infor-
mation). Professor Kerr provides a consent-based view of the third party doctrine that is consonant 
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In addition to their focus on voluntary CSLI transmission, Judges Davis 
and Martin highlighted intimations from the U.S. Supreme Court that suspects 
do not surrender their entire privacy interests in the information that they con-
vey to third parties.152 The judges thought that the Supreme Court sent such 
signals in cases that protected the contents of letters and packages entrusted to 
carriers and in a case that protected the contents of a hotel room from a search 
authorized by the hotel clerk without the permission of the room renter.153 Not-
ing that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their online perso-
nae, the Davis dissent and the Graham panel refused to apply the third party 
doctrine in the historical CSLI context.154 Judges Davis and Martin worried 
that bluntly applying the third party doctrine to law enforcement’s requests for 
historical CSLI would expose an extraordinary amount of private, constitu-
tionally protected information to the government.155 Remarkably, both judges 
relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 2012 in United States v. Jones, in 
which she considered the third party doctrine to be poorly matched to present 
realities, under which ordinary people convey an extraordinary amount of pri-
vate information to third parties.156 
Taken together, Judges Davis and Martin expressed views regarding the 
acquisition of historical CSLI by law enforcement that contrast diametrically 
with those of their colleagues in the Davis, In re Historical Cell Site Data, and 
en banc-Graham majorities.157 These starkly opposed views are but the most 
                                                                                                                           
with the Graham I court’s holding that the government conducts an unreasonable search when it ob-
tains historical CSLI. Kerr, supra note 68, at 588–89. 
 152 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 357–58 (referencing Katz to support reasoning that a person has a 
Fourth Amendment interest in information that he or she seeks to preserve as private); Davis, 785 
F.3d at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases that generate doubt as to 
the third party doctrine’s extent). 
 153 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 357–58 (noting that the Supreme Court suggested in Ex Parte Jack-
son that not all information exposed to a third party is open to warrantless inspection by the govern-
ment); Davis, 785 F.3d at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting) (questioning the third party doctrine’s breadth 
due to Supreme Court opinions in United States v. Jacobsen and Stoner v. California); see also United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (holding that although packages and letters touch the 
hands of the postman, who is a third party, the public maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of the letters and packages); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1964) (deter-
mining that a hotel clerk cannot provide valid consent for the search of a patron’s hotel room). 
 154 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 359–60; Davis, 785 F.3d at 535–38 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 155 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 359–60; Davis, 785 F.3d at 535–38 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 156 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring); Graham I, 796 F.3d at 360; Davis, 785 
F.3d at 538 (Martin, J., dissenting); see Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the 
Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (acknowledging that the concur-
ring justices in Smith expressed doubts about the third party doctrine’s relevance to modern condi-
tions). 
 157 Compare Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45 (holding that an unreasonable search occurs when the 
government obtains historical CSLI without a warrant), and Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the government violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights when it obtained 
and inspected his historical CSLI without a warrant because Davis had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that information), with Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424 (determining that the government does 
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recent arguments in a judicial discussion of privacy dating from the events that 
precipitated the American Revolution.158 The widely divergent Courts of Ap-
peals opinions on the Fourth Amendment’s application to historical CSLI cases 
leave open for debate at least one existential question regarding the nature and 
extent of American liberty: how much of the self does society view as so in-
trinsically private that our fundamental law prevents the government from ac-
cessing it at will?159 
III. THE GOVERNMENT AS THE EVERYMAN: TOWARD A DEFENSIBLE  
CSLI ACQUISITION REGIME 
The Graham II, Davis, and In re Historical Cell Site Data circuit courts 
applied a version of the third party doctrine that violates the Supreme Court’s 
intention in Katz v. United States and Smith v. Maryland.160 By refusing to pro-
tect suspects’ historical CSLI in spite of a societal expectation of privacy in 
location information, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals 
adopted a narrow construction of the Fourth Amendment that the Supreme 
Court must overturn.161 
                                                                                                                           
not violate the Fourth Amendment by acquiring a defendant’s historical CSLI), and Davis, 785 F.3d at 
511 (concluding that no search occurred because Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his historical CSLI), and In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613–14 (refusing to hold that the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his historical CSLI). 
 158 Compare Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980 (2011) (identifying assertive British search and seizure operations 
leading up to the American Revolution as a genesis of the Fourth Amendment), with United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) (asserting that the Framers would not require a warrant for every 
search). 
 159 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing for a liberal construction of the Fourth Amendment that protects the inner self against government 
surveillance). In the Supreme Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis 
quoted Weems v. United States when he wrote that “‘time works changes, brings into existence new 
conditions and purposes.’” Id. at 473 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). 
Specifically, Justice Brandeis warned that “subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy 
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the 
government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of 
what is whispered in the closet.” Id. 
 160 Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (predicating the third party doctrine on 
an objective expectation of privacy as set out in Katz), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 
(1967) (requiring that a suspect have a subjective expectation of privacy for a court to accord his 
communication Fourth Amendment protection), with United States v. Graham (Graham I), 796 F.3d 
332, 338–39, 342 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g, 824 F.3d 421, 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Gra-
ham II) (declining to hold that a suspect enjoys an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
historical CSLI), and United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500–01 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (holding that a suspect has no objective expectation of privacy in his historical 
CSLI), and In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013) (determining that sus-
pects do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI). 
 161 See Graham II, 824 F.3d at 421 (observing that the defendant did not enjoy a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his historical CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 512, 513 (recognizing no objective 
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This Part proposes a two-pronged response to the problem of government 
acquisition and inspection of historical CSLI without probable cause.162 Sec-
tion A advocates for Congress to amend § 2703 by instituting a probable cause 
requirement for historical CSLI orders and by requiring affirmative consent 
from cell users before cellular providers generate and record their CSLI.163 
Section B argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should grant certiorari on a his-
torical CSLI case and use the opportunity presented by that case to constitu-
tionalize the requirement that law enforcement obtain a warrant on a showing 
of probable cause prior to executing a historical CSLI search.164 
A. By the People and for the People: Congress’s Role in  
Safeguarding Individual Privacy 
The Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the 
issue of law enforcement’s acquisition of historical CSLI have suggested that 
Congress has a responsibility to protect individual privacy.165 Congress should 
accept these courts’ suggestion and enact amendments to the SCA that protect 
individuals from government intrusion.166 Specifically, to ensure that law en-
forcement must show probable cause as a prerequisite to obtaining a § 2703 
order, Congress should modify the ECPAAA and incorporate it into a larger 
amendment to the SCA.167 During a hearing on the ECPAAA before the Senate 
                                                                                                                           
expectation of privacy in historical CSLI); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 610 (holding 
that the defendant could not objectively believe that his historical CSLI was private); Marc McAllis-
ter, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 520 (2012) (explaining that compelling empirical research proves that a majority 
of the public views an expectation of privacy in CSLI as reasonable, and that the third party doctrine 
accordingly should be inoperative in historical CSLI cases). 
 162 See infra notes 165–201 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 165–173 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 174–201 and accompanying text. 
 165 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962–64 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring) (suggesting 
that Congress should protect individual privacy interests in historical CSLI by enacting legislation, as 
Congress did in the Wiretap Act); Davis, 785 F.3d at 512 (concluding that citizens concerned about 
privacy issues should demand that Congress change the law rather than seek such a change from the 
judiciary); In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614 (arguing that the legislature is best suited to 
gauge societal expectations of privacy and to balance individual privacy interests with public safety 
concerns). 
 166 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 512; In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614; In re Order Di-
recting a Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t (Elec. Commc’n Serv.), 
620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that Congress must balance the privacy and safety concerns 
surrounding law enforcement access to historical CSLI); Owsley, supra note 13, at 47 (concluding 
that Congress should pass a law that institutes a probable cause requirement for government acquisi-
tion of historical CSLI). 
 167 See S. 356, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 4, 2015); H.R. 
283, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and In-
vestigations) (prescribing a probable cause standard for government acquisition of geolocation data); 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance 
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Committee on the Judiciary, senators heard both from law enforcement offi-
cials concerned that the Act would pose a problem in some crime-fighting situ-
ations, and from privacy advocates who strongly supported the Act’s probable 
cause requirement.168 Congress should include language in the Act that explic-
itly requires law enforcement to show probable cause before a neutral magis-
trate may issue an order compelling the production of CSLI.169 
In addition to prescribing a probable cause standard for historical CSLI 
acquisition, Congress should act to restrain the Supreme Court’s exercise of 
the third party doctrine with regard to CSLI by requiring that cell service pro-
viders obtain affirmative consent from subscribers before collecting their geo-
location information.170 Congress should supplement its amendment to the 
SCA by including the LPPA alongside the modified ECPAAA.171 Doing so 
would protect individual privacy by clearly establishing consent as an affirma-
tive act that requires more than simply turning on one’s phone.172 The legisla-
tive language regarding consent contained within the LPPA would provide the 
judiciary with precisely the guidance for reform of the third party doctrine that 
Justice Sotomayor implied in 2012 in United States v. Jones.173 
                                                                                                                           
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 113–34, at 4 (2013) [hereinafter ECPA Hearings] 
(statement of Representative John Conyers, Jr.) (arguing that Congress must establish a probable 
cause standard for geolocation data collection). 
 168 Compare Reforming the ECPA Hearing, supra note 89, at 5 (testimony of Elana Tyrangiel, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice) (urging that Congress con-
sider the situations, such as the civil context, where a warrant requirement may be problematic), with 
ECPA Hearings, supra note 167, at 1 (responses of Chris Calabrese, Vice President, Policy, Center 
for Democracy & Technology, to Written Questions of Senator Patrick Leahy) (expounding the priva-
cy benefits of warrants in the stored electronic communication context). 
 169 See ECPA Hearings, supra note 167, at 4 (opining that the correct standard for government 
acquisition of geolocation data is probable cause). Representative Conyers argued that citizens have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in not allowing the government to track their every movement. Id. 
Additionally, Representative Conyers specifically noted Justice Alito’s request in 2012 in United 
States v. Jones for legislation on the proper standard of justification for CSLI acquisition by the gov-
ernment. Id. 
 170 See Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 112–857, at 4–5 (2011) [hereinafter Protecting 
Mobile Privacy Hearing] (statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy) (stating that Congress should con-
sider taking action to require communications providers to obtain consent from users before collecting 
their geolocation data); see also id. at 86 (prepared statement of Justin Brookman, Director, Consumer 
Privacy, Center for Democracy & Technology) (arguing that Congress should institute a warrant re-
quirement for the collection of CSLI by law enforcement because the SCA currently does not protect 
information collected without a user’s consent). 
 171 S. 2270, 114th Cong. (2015) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 10, 2015). 
 172 See id. (requiring affirmative consent from cell phone users for the collection of their CSLI); 
Protecting Mobile Privacy Hearing, supra note 170, at 225 (letter from Senator Al Franken) (evincing 
Sen. Franken’s intent that communications companies obtain affirmative consent prior to collecting 
location information from their users). 
 173 See S. 2270 (providing explicit guidance from Congress as to the nature of consent required 
for government acquisition of historical CSLI); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(implying that the third party doctrine is outdated and must be updated for the modern age). 
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B. The Right of the People to Be Secure: The Supreme Court’s Duty to 
Update the Third Party Doctrine for the Digital Age 
When Congress acts in violation of the people’s rights, or when, by inac-
tion, Congress allows old statutes to work harms that intrude upon constitu-
tional protections, the Supreme Court should exercise its power of judicial re-
view and strike down the offending statute.174 First, this Note will assert that 
the Court should update the third party doctrine for the digital age by adopting 
a new balancing test for voluntariness.175 Second, this Note will argue that the 
Court should require a warrant issued on probable cause and subject to existing 
warrant exceptions if analysis under the new third party doctrine formulation 
reveals that the subject has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his or her historical CSLI.176 By striking down § 2703, the Supreme Court will 
update the third party doctrine for the digital age and will protect the objective-
ly reasonable expectation of privacy that most American cell phone users 
share.177 
1. The Government as Everyman, Not Every Man: Updating the Third Party 
Doctrine for the Digital Age 
Reasonable expectations of privacy in information that one shares with a 
third party change as technology develops.178 In the pre-digital world, citizens 
shared information with third parties in a deliberate way.179 In contrast with the 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 463, 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(explaining that the Constitution, as the will of the people, should trump statutes because statutes are 
the work of the people’s agents); D. Brooks Smith, Judicial Review in the United States, 45 DUQ. L. 
REV. 379, 390 (2007) (concluding that the Constitution should trump federal statutes contrary to it). 
 175 See infra notes 186–192 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
 177 See McAllister, supra note 161, at 520 (using statistical analysis to show that the current third 
party doctrine does not comport with contemporary views of personal privacy); Katherine J. Strand-
burg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 
70 MD. L. REV. 614, 641, 649 (2011) (recognizing that the Supreme Court is likely to move away 
from a blunt application of the third party doctrine and toward a more nuanced approach dependent on 
social setting). 
 178 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that technology has changed 
societal expectations of privacy such that a blunt application of the third party doctrine no longer 
conforms to those expectations); Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (shifting from a reliance on trespass doc-
trine to a reliance on reasonable expectations of privacy in response to the advent of electronic eaves-
dropping technology). 
 179 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745 (focusing on Smith’s voluntary conveyance of phone numbers to 
his telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (noting that the bank doc-
uments that the government obtained were composed of information that Miller voluntarily conveyed 
to his bank). 
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Smith era, citizens today frequently share a tremendous amount of sensitive 
information with third parties in transactions that are entirely involuntary.180 
Historical CSLI is a prime example of such involuntarily transferred pri-
vate information.181 Citizens in the modern American republic must own a cell 
phone to fully participate in society, but to operate a cell phone, a user has no 
choice but to produce location information and communicate it with their cel-
lular provider.182 The third party doctrine does not apply to CSLI cases because 
cell phone users do not voluntarily convey CSLI to their phone companies.183 
When courts prohibit the government from invoking the third party doc-
trine to provide Fourth Amendment justification for its warrantless collection 
of historical CSLI, they should also reject government reliance on trespass or 
Katz reasonableness analyses to accomplish the same end.184 Given the statisti-
cal evidence, judicial rulings, and implication of the home that suggest a 
strong, objective expectation of privacy in location information, it is likely that 
the Supreme Court would find such an expectation and would require a war-
rant if the government seeks to obtain historical CSLI.185 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–93 (2014) (expressing concern that searches of 
cell phones are equivalent to rummaging due to the amount of sensitive information contained within 
those phones); United States v. Graham (Graham I), 796 F.3d 332, 350, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d 
on reh’g, 824 F.3d 421, 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Graham II) (observing that the government 
captured 29,659 data points on the defendant, and concluding that the transmission of CSLI is invol-
untary). 
 181 See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Affirmance of 
the District Court at 19–22, In re Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866619 (distinguishing 
Smith and Miller from CSLI cases based on the lack of voluntary CSLI transmission); Susan Freiwald, 
Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 
681, 732 (2011) (concluding that cell phone users do not create CSLI voluntarily). 
 182 City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (observing that cell phones are so 
widespread in American society that they have become an essential tool of modern life); Graham I, 
796 F.3d at 356 (holding that courts cannot find that a suspect has surrendered his expectation of pri-
vacy simply by participating in modern life through the ownership and use of a cell phone). 
 183 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 353 (recognizing that the creation and transmission of CSLI is an 
involuntary activity); Davis, 785 F.3d at 534 (Martin, J., dissenting) (declining to apply the third party 
doctrine because cell phone users involuntarily transfer their CSLI); Freiwald, supra note 181, at 733 
(observing that cell phone users do not voluntarily create and transfer CSLI). 
 184 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (observing that new technologies can send 
reasonable expectations of privacy into flux); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding 
that intrusions into the home by technological means are presumptively unreasonable); United States 
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717–18 (1984) (deciding that the government conducts an unreasonable search 
when it tracks a suspect inside his home without a warrant). 
 185 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (emphasizing the sanctity of the home); Graham I, 796 F.3d at 
345 (holding that cell phone subscribers have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
historical CSLI); Corbett, supra note 133, at 226 (arguing that the Supreme Court likely will find 
government collection of historical CSLI pursuant to § 2703 order to be unconstitutional); McAllister, 
supra note 161, at 520 (presenting empirical research suggesting an objective expectation of privacy 
in historical CSLI). 
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The Supreme Court should modernize the third party doctrine by dispens-
ing with the notion that an individual loses an objective expectation of privacy 
in any information that he or she voluntarily exposes to a third party.186 The 
Supreme Court should instead institute a balancing test predicated on a ful-
crum of necessary disclosure.187 If the subject was forced to reveal the infor-
mation, or functionally was forced to do so, then courts should find that he or 
she does not lose his or her objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information; if the subject revealed the information for the sake of convenience 
alone, then courts should find that he or she lost Fourth Amendment protection 
of the information.188 By more closely defining the third party doctrine’s vol-
untariness requirement, this balancing analysis would assure that courts allow 
the government to act not as an omniscient surveillance apparatus, but rather as 
a typical person to whom a third party betrays a client’s confidence.189 
This test would require a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the 
subject transferred his or her information to a third party in a truly voluntary 
manner.190 The analysis under this theory for historical CSLI cases is relatively 
simple; transmitting CSLI is required to operate a cell phone, and operating a 
cell phone is required to fully participate in modern society.191 Thus, transfer-
ring CSLI to a phone company—a functionally involuntary activity—falls on 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the third party doc-
trine should be updated for the digital age); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 863 (Mass. 
2014) (holding that CSLI is qualitatively different than the business records in Smith and Miller, war-
ranting a deviation from the third party doctrine application in those cases); Erin Murphy, The Case 
Against the Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (propos-
ing a balancing test based on voluntariness to determine whether a subject loses his or her expectation 
of privacy by conveying information to a third party). 
 187 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (calling for modernization of the third 
party doctrine); Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355–56 (disregarding the notion of voluntary CSLI conveyance 
upon which the third party doctrine is predicated); Murphy, supra note 186, at 1252 (proposing a 
balancing test to replace the current third party doctrine). 
 188 See Murphy, supra note 186, at 1252 (suggesting an updated third party doctrine). 
 189 See id. at 1250 (arguing that the Founders feared a surveillance state, and sought to prevent the 
advent of one by restricting the government’s search powers to those that ordinary citizens may em-
ploy for private purposes). 
 190 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (opining that citizens have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in some of the information that they disclose to third parties); Davis, 785 
F.3d at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the notion that 
citizens always lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that they disclose to third 
parties); Murphy, supra note 186, at 1252 (putting forward an updated third party doctrine predicated 
on a continuum of disclosure). 
 191 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355–56 (holding that cell phone use is necessary for participation in 
American culture); Davis, 785 F.3d at 535–36 (Martin, J., dissenting) (declining to find a knowing 
disclosure of CSLI solely through use of a cell phone). 
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the protected side of the third party doctrine balancing test that this Note pro-
poses.192 
2. No Warrants Shall Issue, but upon Probable Cause: A Return to 
Reasonableness 
If the Supreme Court reforms the third party doctrine as this Note sug-
gests, then the justices would next proceed to consider whether to require a 
probable cause warrant for the government’s acquisition of historical CSLI as 
the Graham I panel did.193 In the absence of legislation from Congress, such as 
that proposed above, popular opinion and judicial decisions would support a 
Supreme Court decision finding that citizens have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI.194 Statistical data clearly show 
that cellular subscribers have an expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI 
that society would regard as reasonable.195 State courts, federal trial courts, and 
federal appellate courts all have determined that cell phone users have an ob-
jectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI.196 Further, 
the Supreme Court appears ready to borrow from the traditional trespass analy-
sis by incorporating a statement on the sanctity of the home into a potential 
opinion on CSLI acquisition and use by law enforcement.197 Cell phone users 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355–56 (implying that cell phone users are functionally required to 
transmit their CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 535–36 (Martin, J., dissenting) (determining that cell phone 
users involuntarily create and transmit their CSLI). 
 193 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45 (holding that the defendant had an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his historical CSLI); Corbett, supra note 133, at 226 (concluding that the 
Supreme Court likely will find the warrantless acquisition of historical CSLI to be a Fourth Amend-
ment violation but will stop short of requiring a warrant due to exclusionary rule exceptions). 
 194 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (prohibiting searches that invade suspects’ homes); Graham I, 
796 F.3d at 345 (holding that citizens have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
historical CSLI); Corbett, supra note 133, at 226 (noting that the Supreme Court will likely determine 
that law enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment when relying upon § 2703 orders to collect 
historical CSLI); McAllister, supra note 161, at 520 (establishing that empirical data reveal an objec-
tively reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI). 
 195 See McAllister, supra note 161, at 520 (explaining that the results of a statistical analysis show 
a strong public expectation of privacy in location data). 
 196 Graham I, 796 F.3d at 345; Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dissenting); In re Order Au-
thorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119–20 (E.D.N.Y 
2011) (holding that people retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term CSLI); In re Order 
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Information of a Specified Wireless Telephone, 849 F. Supp. 2d 
526, 539 (D. Md. 2011) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in location data when a subject is 
tracked for a period of thirty days); Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 865–66 (concluding that criminal defend-
ants have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 
632 (N.J. 2013) (holding that under the New Jersey state constitution, the defendant had an objective-
ly reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI). 
 197 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (refusing to sanction government surveillance that penetrated 
the home); Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (commenting on sanctity of the home). 
In Jones and Soldal, the Supreme Court emphasized that Katz augmented, rather than extinguished, 
property-based Fourth Amendment protections that center on the sanctity of the home. Jones, 132 S. 
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have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical 
CSLI.198 
Following Katz, the Supreme Court should require that the government 
obtain a warrant issued on a finding of probable cause before acquiring histori-
cal CSLI and using it at trial.199 If the Supreme Court institutes a probable 
cause warrant requirement for the collection and use at trial of historical CSLI, 
then the Court also should hold that all pre-existing warrant exceptions apply 
to warrants for historical CSLI.200 Authorizing reasonable law enforcement 
actions would create a safety valve to protect the public in exigent circum-
stances when law enforcement needs are at their maximum.201 
CONCLUSION 
Congress and the Supreme Court should act in concert to protect the 
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens when the government seeks their histori-
cal CSLI from cellular providers. The reason for doing so is as old as the 
American Revolution itself. The Founders sought to create a nation ruled in an 
absolute sense—not by men, but by law. They thought that the best republics 
were those that, by the arrangement of their powers, best and most impartially 
executed just laws. As time—and technology—work changes, this vital under-
                                                                                                                           
Ct. at 950–51; Soldal, 506 U.S. at 64. The Graham I court recognized this signal from the Supreme 
Court and expressed its concern that historical CSLI could track a subject to and within a home, where 
Fourth Amendment protections are at a maximum. 796 F.3d at 346–47. 
 198 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45 (determining that cell phone users have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dissent-
ing) (deciding that cell phone users have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
historical CSLI); Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 312–13 (observing that Fourth Amendment con-
cerns arise when historical CSLI tracks citizens within their homes). 
 199 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 344–45 (deciding that the government must obtain a warrant before 
acquiring historical CSLI); Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that without a prob-
able cause warrant, the government violates the Fourth Amendment when it collects historical CSLI); 
Corbett, supra note 133, at 226 (arguing that a showing of probable cause is necessary if the govern-
ment seeks to obtain historical CSLI). 
 200 See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 345 (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for 
historical CSLI unless a warrant exception applies); Corbett, supra note 133, at 226 (noting that the 
Supreme Court likely will find that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for the collection of 
historical CSLI, but that the Court also will find the exigency exception applicable to many CSLI 
cases). To protect citizens from an imminent risk of harm by a criminal suspect, the Court may reaf-
firm the exigency exception and allow the warrantless acquisition of historical CSLI. See Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (establishing a warrant exception for exigent circumstances 
when police reasonably believe that the occupant of a residence is or may imminently be seriously 
injured); Corbett, supra note 133, at 226 (noting that the Supreme Court may invoke a warrant excep-
tion to allow government collection of historical CSLI without a warrant). 
 201 See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (implying that warrant exceptions arise when the needs of 
law enforcement become so compelling that they outweigh an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy); Graham I, 796 F.3d at 345 (requiring that the government obtain a warrant for the collection 
of historical CSLI unless a warrant exception applies). 
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standing of our national character has remained the same. To secure our na-
tion’s commitment to the rule of law, the government and its officials must 
heed the fundamental commands enshrined in our Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. A government that violates its Constitution engenders contempt for the 
law and invites anarchy by encouraging every man to follow rules of his own 
creation. Our leaders must remain true to the protections that our Founders so 
wisely adopted at our nation’s birth. 
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